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Abstract
In this paper economic models are discussed and introduced that consider situations
in which price restrictions and regulations prevent pricos from adjusting according to
the law oF supply and demand. In most of these models markets are cleared through
the adjustment of quantities, i.e., by rationing the excess supply or the excess
demand. In equilibrium there is only ratíoning on at most one side of each market,
while at least one market is not rationed at all. In particular there is such an
equilibrium for which there is no demand rationing at all. In order to guarantee that
at such a supply constrained equilibrium an a priori chosen commodity, for example
money, is not rationed, we have to allow for price flexibility with respect to the
price of this commodity. Supply rationing or unemployment has a serious impact on
the income of the rationed agents. To deal with this problem we also consider models
with unemployment compensations.
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PRICE RIGIDITIES AND RATIONING
G. van der Laan and A.J.J. Talmaa
1. Introduction
Perfect competition is a basic assumption in classical economic theory. This
implies that all agents in the economy are price takers and therefore express their
demands and supplies of the commodities given the prevailing prices. A market is in
equilibrium if total demand is equal to total supply. Trade will only take place at
equilibrium prices. It is assumed that there are no restrictions on the prices and that
prices adjust infinitely fast. Walras considered the problem of the existence of
general equilibrium, i.e., a system of prices at which all markets clear simultaneously.
Under rather general assumptions the existence of such a Walrasian price system has
been proved in the fifties by Debreu and others.
Unemployment and excess supply on commodity markets are serious problems
in many countries. Almost all semi-annual meetings of the government leaders of the
European common market countries are mainly devoted to tackle problems like butter
mountains, wine pools, milk lakes, grain warehouses, olive pyramids, dung-hills, and
an unemployment army. In these cases price restrictions and regulations prevent
prices from adjusting according to the law oC supply and demand. So, prices can not
reach their Walrasian equilibrium values; nevertheless, trade takes place. In fact,
markets are cleared through the adjustment of quantities instead of prices, e.g., by
imposing quotas.
In the mid seventies Drèze (1975) and Benassy (1975) independently
developed models for equilibrium under price rigidities, such as price controls,
minimum wages or price indexation. Both authors introduced the concept of quantity
rationing in general equilibrium models under restrictions on the prices. In this
approach an agent chooses that commodity bundle which is most preferred by him,
subject to both his budget constraint and to quantity constraints on net trade. The
quantity rationing may affect either supply or demand of a commodity, but it never
affects both simultaneously. It is further assumed that no quantity restrictions are
allowed unless price rigidities are binding.
z
The models of Drèze and Benassy differ in the way they describe the
behaviour of the individual agents under quantity ralioning. In Dràze's model, the
agents express their rntioned demands and supplies, i.e., on each market the agems'
demands and supplies satisfy the imposed rationing scheme. This kind of behaviour
has also been studied by Younès (1975), Grandmont and Laroque (1976), Hahn
(1978), Laroque (1978), van der Laan (1980), and Kurz (1982). In the model of
Benassy the agents express their effective demands and supplies. This notion goes
back to Clower (1965) and Barro and Grossman (1971) and reflects the agent's
demand or supply for a commodity when he takes into account only the rationing on
the other commodities. For example, if a consumer is constrained in the demand for
milk, he compensates his desire for milk through a~higher demand for wine,
irrespective of the rationing on the wine market. On the other hand, his effective
demand for milk will not take into account the rationing on milk and typically
exceeds the level of rationing, due to rationing on wine and other substitutes.
Whereas for Drèze's model the expressed and realized quantities of trade are in
equilibrium equal to each other, in the model of Benassy trade is realized through
assignments induced by the effective demands and supplies. These assignments yield
new perceived rationing schemes. Equilibrium is defined as a state in which agents
have no incentive to adjust their effective demands or supplies according to these
new schemes.
Under price rigidities, Drèze and Benassy proved the existence of an
equilibrium such that at least one a priori chosen numeraire commodity is not
rationed at all, while for the other commodities there is fationing on the demand or
the supply side, but not on both sides of the same market simultaneously. If money is
one of the commodities, this commodity can be chosen to be the numeraire, implying
that there exists an equilibrium with no rationing on money.
In practice, rationing of supplies seems to occur much more frequently than
rationing of demands. Moreover, both van der Laan (1980) and Kurz (1982) argue
that in practice it is difficult to implement rationing of demand. T'hese observations
lead these authors to prove the existence of a so-called supply-constrained or
unemployment equilibrium. In such an equilibrium only supplies are rationed whereas
at least one commodity is not rationed at all. However, which commodities are not
rationed is not known in advance, so that it can not be assumed that there is an
unemployment equilibrium in which the supply of an a priori chosen commodity is
unrationed. Not surprisingly, more price flexibility is needed to assure the existence
of an unemployment equilibrium in which an a priori given commodity is not
rationed. This topic has been attacked by van der Laan (1984), Dehez and Drèze
(1984), and Weddepohl (forthcoming), by introducing flexible money prices.
3
Rationing of the supplies has a serious impact on the income of the rationed
agents. Therefore van der Laan ( 1980, 1981) considered models with unemployment
compensations for unemployed people.
This paper has been organized as follows. !n the nezt section we give the basic
assumptions about the Wolrasian model of an exchange economy. In Section 3 we
introduce price rigidities and define constrained equilibria. Section 4 deals with
effective demand and treats the model of Benassy. This model yields the so-called
neo-Keynesian or K-equilibrium. In Section 5 the different types of K-equilibria are
discussed. Also we give a characteri7ation of the types of equilibria for the well-
known Malinvaud model. In Section 6 we discuss the problem of maaipulable
rationing schemes. The ezistence of constrained equilibria will be proved in Section
7. After a discussion about supply-constrained and demand-constrained equilibria in
Section 8, the existence of supply-constrained equilibria without rationing on the
money commodity is proved in Section 9. In Section 10 we motivate the occurrence
of supply-constrained equilibria. In the following two sections several models with
unemployment compensations are considered, in Section 11 some models without
money and in Section 12 a model for a monetary economy. In the latter model the
policy of compensations results in inflationary or deftationary impulses.
2. Preliminaries
We consider an exchange economy with ntl commodities, indezed j-
O,l,...,n, and m agents, indexed i- 1,...,m. For simplicity, we assume that each agent
represents a consumer (or household), who maximizes his utility under the budget
constraint and quantity constraints. Consumer i, i~ 1,...,m, is characterized by a
consumption set X', a utility function u' on X' representing his preferences, and a
vector of initial endowments w' e Rntl. Let f! -(x E Rntl ~ xj ~ 0, j~ 0,...,n) denote
the nonnegative orthant of Rn}1. For all i, we make the following asaumptions,
where w a Ei w' is the vector of total initial endowments.
A 1. The consumption set X' is a compact t~, convex subset of (1, containing
the set {z E fl ~ zj 5 wj, j- 0,...,n).
It is ~utticimt to wume that th~ wN X' ~ev alwd. Howwer to ~implify th~ peooó we awutm th~t th~ wb
~re compsct, i.e., clo~ed ~nd bounded.
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AZ. The utility function is a strictly quasi-concave ~) continuous function
from Xt to R, satisfying monotonicity, i.e., for all x,y e X', xj ~ yj for all j
and xj i yj for at least one j implies uf(x) i ut(y).
A3. For each commodity j, w'j i 0.
Given p in f2`(0}, let d'(p) E X' be a consumption bundle satisfying consumer is
budget constraint pTx ~ pTwt, such that no other x E Xt satisfying the budget
constraint is preferred to d'(p). Under the assumptions Al, A2, and A3 such a
consumption bundle exists and is preferred to all other x E X' satisfying the budget
constraint, which implies that d'(p) is unique. Moreover, the assumptions imply that
consumer i's demand function d': II~(o) y X' is continuó'us. Let z(p) denote the total
excess demand at price p, i.e.,
z(P) z Ei (dt(P) - wt).
Then the function z is a continuous function from tt~(o} 4o Rntl satisfying for all p
E fl~(0),
i) pTZ(p) - 0(Walras' law, i.e., the total value of the ezcess demands is equal
to zero),
ii) z(ap) z z(p) for all a~ 0(homogeneity of degree zero),
iii) zj(p) ~ 0 if pj ~ 0(desirability).
s ~
A price vector p is called a Walrasian equilibrium price vector iC z(p ) a 0, i.e., if
~
p is a zero point of z. For the proof of the existence of such a price vector we refer
to Debreu (1959) and others.
3. Constrained eauilibrium
Drèze (1975) considered the problem of restrictions on the prices. In his
model the commodity ;ndexed by j- 0 serves as the numeraire commodity. Because
of the homogene;ty property its price can be set equal to one without loss of
generality. The prices of the other commodities are restricted from below and above
by constants pj and pj for commodity j, j- 1,...,n. In a later section we will
discuss more general price restrictions. Assuming that for all j~ 0, 0 c~j ~ pj c
oo, the nonempty set P~ oC admissible prices becomes
It i~ ~ufficient to wume quui-conasvity of tM utility function~. tlmrw~r, auumin~ ~triet quai-concavity
implia~ that the demand functiom are continuou~ function~ in~t~~d ot upp~r Nmi-continuou~ multifunction~.
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Pp ~(p E t1 ~ pp ~ l. Rj 5 Pj 5 Pj for all j f O).
Because of the restrictions on the prices, an equilibrium price vector p dces not
need to be an element of Pp. Drèze (1975) defined an equilibrium concept involving
quantity constraints on the individual excess supplies and excess demands. For a price
vector p E Pp, a vector (' E-Q of constraints on the net ~upplies of consumer i, and
a vector L~ E ft of constraints on the net demands of i, the constrained budget set of
consumer i becomes
BtíP,f~.L~) .(x E Xt ~ pTx c pTw~, !t ~ x-wr ~ Lt),
The constrained demand of consumer i, denoted dt(p,lt,Lt), is defined as the element
in the constrained budget set of i which mazimizes i's utility. Because of the strict
quasi-concavity of u~ this element is uniquely determined. We say that agent i is
rationed on the demand (supply) of commodity j if yt is preferred to xt ~ dt(p,lt,Lt)
where y~ maximizes i s utility in the budget set of i when L~j is increased (!tj
decreased respectively) with an arbitrarily small amount. The strict quasi-concavity
of the utility function implies that a consumer is not rationed on the demand (or
supply) of commodity j if x~. - wl. c Lt (or zt. - wt. i It-).J J j J J J
pefinition 3.1. A constrained equilibrium is a set of consumptions xt e Xt, i ~
I,...,m, a set of supply rationing schemes !t E-tl and demand rationing schemes Lt E
CJ, i~ I,...,m, and a price vector p E Pp such that
a) for all i, xt s dt(p,It,Lt),
b)Ei xt~w.
c) for all j, xtj - w'j L L'j for some i implies xhj - whj ~!hj for all h, and
ztj - w~j -!tj for some i implies xhj - whj c Lhj for all h,
d) for all j, pj c pj implies Ltj i z~j - wtj for all i, and pj i Qj impties Irj
c ztj - wtj for all i.
Conditions a) and b) require that the consumption of each agent equals his
constrained demand and that the total consumption equals the total initial
endowment. Condition c) implies that at a constrained equilibrium not both sides of a
market are rationed simultaneously. We say that a market is frictionless when there is
rationing on at most one side of the market. So, condition c) requires that in
equilibrium each market must be frictionless. Finally, condition d) guarantees that io
equilibrium there is no demand rationing if the price is not on its upper bound and
that there is no supply rationing if the price is not on its lower bound.
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There are two trivial constrained equilibria: x' - w' for all i, !' - 0 for all i,
L'j~Oforalliand j,andp-p,;andx'awrforalli,l'j ~Oforalliand j,L'-0
for all i, and p- p. In the first case there is complete rationing on all excess
supplies, so that for all i w' is the unique element of i's constrained budget set of i
and therefore satisfies condition a). In the second case there is complete rationing on
all excess demands. Then the budget set of i becomes
Bl(P,I~,L') z(xEX' ~ pTX ~ pTw', l' ~ x-w' ~ 0},
so that d'(p,!',L') equals w' due to the monotonicity assumption. We conclude this
section with [wo definitions.
Definition 3.2. A constrained equilibrium is a Drèze equilibrium if for all i, !t~ --oo
and L'~ 3 ao.
Definition 3.3. A constrained equilibrium is a supply-constrained (or unemployment)
equilibrium if for all i, L'j a ao for all j and !'j 3-ao for at least one j.
Observe that both the Drèze and the supply-constrained equilibrium are nontrivial
equilibria. In the Drèze equilibrium there is no rationing on the numeraire
commodity. In a supply-constrained equilibrium there is no rationing on the demand
side, while at least one commodity is not constrained on the supply side. The
existence of Drèze and supply-constrained equilibria will be proved in Section 7.
4. Effective demands and K-eauilibria
In the Drèze model it is assumed that an agent reveals his constrained demand
d'(p,l',L'). This constrained demand is the response of the agent to the message
(p,l~,L~) called by an auctioneer. In this response lhe consumer takes into account his
quantity constraints. Because the constrained demands are revealed, we have that in
equilibrium there is no difference between the expressed demands and the realized
transactions. All agents choose a consumption bundle out of their constrained budget
set and the expressed demand satisfies therefore the rationing schemes. So, the
constrained demands do not reveal binding constraints, i.e., a constrained agent dces
not reveal his desire to trade more. Now, suppose we have consumption bundles x' E
X', i~ 1,...,m, a set of rationing schemes !t E-f2 and Lt E ft, i a l,...,m, and a price
vector pEP~ such that the conditions a), b) and d) of Definition 3.1 are satisfied, but
condition c) is violated. In this case at least one market is not frictiontess, i.e., on at
least one market some agents are constrained in their excess demands and some others
in their excess supplies. Both the demand-constrained and supply-constrained agents
can be made better off by trading more. However, there are no signals about this
desire to trade more, because the agents express just their constrained demands. So,
the economy can get stuck in this situation, violating condition c) of frictionless
markets in equilibrium. To get out of such situations the agents have to reveal their
desired trades instead of their constrained demands.
Following Clower (1965), Leijonhufvud (1968) and others, Benassy (1975)
used the concept of effective demand. The effective demand of an agent for a
commodity reveals an individual's offer to buy or to sell on the market, and not the
actually realized constrained transaction. This effective demand is expressed
separately on each market and dces not take into account the rationing scheme
perceived on that market. To reach equilibrium, each agent is assigned a transaction
and perceives therefore new quantity constraints on his exchange. Due to these new
constraints, each agent will express new effective demands, and so on. An
equilibrium is reached when the new perceived constraints coincide with the previous
ones and all markets are frictionless. This type of disequilibrium models in which the
expressed demands may differ from the realized transactions has been studied by
Barro and Grossman (1971), Malinvaud (1977), and in a general context by Benassy
( t 975, 1982).
In Benassy's analysis the price vector is completely fixed, i.e., Qj - pj for
all j and hence P~ contains only one element, denoted by p. The numeraire
commodity j z 0 is assumed to be money, which serves as the sole medium of
exchange. Consumers derive utility from money as a store of value. It is assumed that
money buys commodit;es and vice versa, but commodities do not buy commodities.
So, there are n markets, and transactions between commodities and money take place
on each market. The difference between an individual's terminal holding and initial
holding of money is equal to the difference between the money values of the initial
anA terminal bundle of commodities. On each market rationing may occur. The
reasoning above implies that there is only rationing on the demand or supply of the
consumption goods and labour and not on money. So, in this section the rationing
scheme of a consumer i will be a pair (l~, L~) with !~ E-f), Lt E f1, and -l~~ ~ Lt0 ~
oo.
When et a( e'1,...,e'n)T is a demand vector of agent i for the non-money
commodities, then, given the rationing scheme (It,Lt), the resulting trade of
commodity j for agent i will be
z'j(e'.l~,Lt) z max(l~j, min(e~j - w~j, L~j)), 1 ~ I,...,n.
a
To be sure that the resulting assignments x'j(e',l',L') - w'j t ztj(e',1',L') of the non-
numeraire commodities j~ 0 and the resulting terminal holding x'B(e',1',L') - w'B -
Ej pjz'j(e',!',L') of the numeraire commodity are feasible, any demand vector e' E
Rn of agent i must be restricted to the set ~
Z~U~,L') -(e~ E Rn ~ x'(e',l',L') E 7C'),
with x'(e',1',L') the (ntl)-vector with components xtj(e',l',L'), j- 0,...,n. The
demand vector expressed by agent i should be an element in Z'(Ir,L') which
maximizes the resulting utility u'(x'(e',!',L')) over all e' in Z'(1',L'). Let E'(l',Lt) be
the set of all such elements in Z'(I',L'). Clearly, the constrained demand vector
c'(!',L') where c'j(!',L') z d'j(p,l',L') for the non-numeraire commodities j- 1,...,n
belongs to the set E'(I',L') since the constrained demand d'(p,l',L') maximizes u'
under the quantity constraints P and L'. However, generally the set E'(!',L') contains
more than one element. In particular, we will show that one of these elements is the
ieffective demand.
The effective demand on a market is defined as the utility maximizing
demand for that commodity without taking into account the quantity constraints on
that market (see Benassy ( 1982)). Formally, the effective demand etj(lt,L') of
consumer i for commodity j~ 0 is the j-th component of the vector which solves
the problem
max u'(x) such that
x E X', PTx ~ pTw', and 1'h c xh - w'h ~ L'h, h~ O,j.
In this constrained maximization problem the consumer takes into account all
quantity constraints ezcept the constraints on market jl Recall that there are no
constraints for j- 0, so that h~ O,j might be replaced by h~ j. Let ~'~([',Ltj be
the solution to problem (P~). Solving this problem for each j a 1,...,n, we obtain the
effective demand vector e'(I',Lt) E Rn of consumer i, i z I,...,m, by taking for each
commodity j the j-th component of the corresponding solution vector, i.e.
e~jU',L') ~ ~'~j(1~,L'), j - 1,...,n.
Clearly, in general the effective excess demand e'j(1',L') - w'j does not satisfy the
rationings I'j and L'j on market j. However, under assumption A2 the effective
demand vector belongs to E'(!',L'). We remark that concavity of the utility function
is not sufficient (see Grandmont (1977)). [n the following we denote the trade
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z'j(e'(1',L'),l',L') on market j resulting from the effective demand er(1r,L') by
, i i
z jU ,L ). j - I,...,n.
Theorem 4.1. Under A2, e'(1',L') E E'(!',L') holds.
Pr of`. Following F3enassy (1982, pages 188~9) it can be shown that under strict quasi-
concavity of the u[ility function u', the trade z'j(!',L') on market j is equal to the
constrained excess demand c'j(l',L') - w'j, j a 1,...,n. Since c'(1~,L') belongs to
E'(f',!.') this proves the theorem.
The set of rationing schemes (I~,L'), i ~ I,...,m, is said to constitute an
effective demand equilibrium if Ei z'j(!',L') ~ 0, j z I,...,n. From the fact that
z'j(f',L') equals c'j(f',L') - w'j for all i and j, it follows that an effective demand
equilibrium yields a constrained equilibrium only when the realized consumption xrj
s z'j(I',L') t w'j satisfies condition c) of Definition 3.1 for all i and for all j~ 0.
This condition of frictionless markets possibly may not hold at an effective demand
equilibrium. Observe that condition d) is redundant because P~ contains only p as the
unique element. If, for some j, Ei z~j(l~,L') ~ 0, then transactions on market j can
not be carried out and we do not have a constrained equilibrium.
To reach a constrained equilibrium, a set of assignment functions Fr: Rnm y
Rn, i- I,...,m, is introduced. These assignment functions are such that on each
market the total assignments to the demanders is equal to the total assignments to the
suppliers whereas on the short side of the market the agents realize their effective
excess demands. More precisely, if ë~(ël,...,ëm) E Rnm is a set of
effective excess demand vectors given by ë~ - e~j(I',L') - w~j, j~ 1,...,n, i s
1,...,m, then for all j the assignments z~j s F~j(ë), i~ I,...,m satisfy the following
conditions:
1) Ei z'j - 0,
2) for all i, 0 5 z'j ~ ë~j if ë'j i 0, and ë'j 5 z~j 5 0 if ë~~ 5 0,
3)forall i,z'jsë'jif ë'j?OandEië'j50,andz~j Që'j if
ë~j 5 0 and Ei ë~j ~ 0.
Condition 1) says that the assignments can be realized, condition 2) that one can not
force any agent to exchange more than he wants and that all agents remain at the
same s;de of the markets after assignment, and condition 3) that agents on the short
side of the market can realize their effective excess demands. The last condition will
imply frictionless markets, since on at most one side of the market agents can not
reatize their effective demands.
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Given a set of effective excess demands the functions F', i t I,...,m,
determine realizable transactions of each consumer for the non-money commodities.
The resulting changes in money holdings follow immediately from the fact that
commodities are exchanged against money, i.e., z'0 ~-Ej pjz'j, i s 1,...,m.
Although the assignments are realizable, this dces not imply that transactions
will in fact take place. Through the assignments each individual i may perceive on
market j a difference between his expected transaction z'j(!', L') and his assignment
z'j. Based on this observation the individual wants to adjust his perceived rationing
scheme. Since for all j, both z'j(!', L') and z'j are determined by the set of effective
excess demand vectors, we may assume that this new scheme, say (k',K'), is a
function of the effective excess demands only. More precisely, we assume that for all
i, i 3 I,...,m,
kt - g'(ë) and K' - G'(ë),
with g': Rnm y Rn}1 and G': Rnm y Rntl functions satisfying g'B(é) --ao and
G'0(ë)- ao, and for all j~ 0
4) g'j(ë) ~ min (O.z'j) and G'j(ë) i max (O,z'j) if z'j s ë'j,
5)g'j(ë)~z'jifz'j~ë'jandG'j(ë)az'jifz'j~ë'j.
These conditions say that the new rationing scheme allows for the assignments to be
carried out and that the new rationing equals the assignment íf and only if the
individual is on the long side of the market and the assignment constraints his
effective excess demand. These adjustments of the perceived rationing schemes helps
us to escape from getting stuck in an equilibrium with non-frictionless markets.
Perceiving the new rationing scheme the individuals want to revise their
effective demands. The effective demand of i will not change if the new rationing
scheme (k',K') for i coincides with the otd rationing scheme (!',L'). If this holds for
all agents i the assignments yield a neo-Keynesian or K-equilibrium (see Benassy
(1975, 1982)).
Definition 4.2. A K-equilibrium with respect to a price system p is a set of
assignments z' E Rn, and effective excess demand vectors ë' E Rn, i 3 1,...,m,
and a set of rationing schemes !' E-t7 and L' E(t, with !'0 --oo and L'0 - oo, i
I,...,m, such that for all i and for j~ 1,...,n
(a) ëtj m e~(!',Lt) - w'j.
(b) z'j - F~j(ë),
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(c) !'j - g'j(ë) and L'j ~ G'j(ë).
Observe that at a K-equilibrium the expressed effective excess demands need
not to be equal to the realized transactions after the assignments. If so, i.e., if ztj ~
ë~j, then we obtain from condition 5) that g~j(ë) - ztj iC ë~j ~ z'j and
G~j(ë) - z'j if ë'j i z~j, and hence it follows from condition c) of DeCinition
4.2 that ztj - Pj if ë'j ~ z'j and z'j - L'j if ëtj s zrj. Moreover, if z'j - ëtj
it follows from condition 4) and Crom condition c) of Definition 4.2 that (tj c ë'j
- z'j ~ L'j. So, in equilibrium we have that for all i and j
z'j - max(!'j, min(ë'j, L'j)) - z'j(!',Lt).
Hence, for all j the assignment z'j is equal to ztj(!',L'). Since Theorem 4.1 says that
e'(!',L') E E'(!',L'), it follows that in a K-equilibrium for each consumer the vector
of realized consumptions maximizes his utility in the constrained budget set and is
equal to the constrained demand vector. Moreover condition 3) guarantees that agents
on the short side can realize their eCfective excess demands. Together with condition
4) this implies that at a K-equilibrium all markets are frictionless. This gives us the
next result.
Corollarv 4.3. Let the set of transactions z', effective excess demand vectors ë',
and rationing schemes (!',L'), i- I,...,m, be a K-equilibrium with respect to p. Then
with p as the vector of fixed prices, the set of consumptions x' defined by
z'j - z~j t w'j, j- 1,...,n and x'~ - w'0 - Ej pjz'j, i- I,...,m
and the set of rationing schemes (lt,Lt), i- 1,...,m, constitute a constrained
equilibrium with no quantity constraints on the numeraire commodity.
The property of frictionless markets impties that a K-equilibrium is efficient
market by market. That means that for a set of K-equilibrium transactions z' with
rationing schemes (!', L'), i- 1,...,m, there is no other feasible set of transactions y',
i- I,...,m, yielding a higher utility for all agents, such that Ei y' - 0 and there exisu
a j~ 0 such that for all i and for all h'M j,
'h ~ L'h.
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So, it is not possible to make all agents better off by a more efficient allocation of
just one of the commodities s). The market by market efficiency follows from the
fact that for ;ill i, r,i yiclds utility maximization under l~tt ~ x~h - wih ~ l.~lt for all
h, i.e., the realized consumption xt is equal to the constrained demand of i. Indeed,
when each agent i would be better off under a yt yielding, for some j~ 0, maximal
utility under Ith 5 yth 5 Lth for all h~ j, we must have that at the K-equilibrium
all agents are constrained on market j while Ei ylj - 0. However, that contradicts the
fact that there is only rationing on at most one side of the market.
Below we prove the existence of a K-equilibrium and hence the existence of
a constrained equilibrium. Observe that this proof needs the specification of the
functions gtj and Glj for all i and j, see also the end of Section 6.
Theorem 4.4. If for all i the functions gt and Gt are continuous, then there exists a
K-equilibrium.
Proof; For given rationing scheme (Il, Lt) let xt(j) maximize i's utility without taking
into account the constraints on market j. Since xt(j) E Xt we have that for all j,
xtj(j) i 0, while the budget constraint implies that xtj(j) - wtj c bj with bj a maxi
Ehfj phw~h~pj~ Hence for all i and j, the effective excess demand vectors ét with
é'j - x~j(j) - wtj satisfy -wj ~ ëlj ~ bj. Let W be the subset of Rn defined by
W 3(Y E Rn ~-wj 5 Yj 5 bj, j~ 1,....n},
and let Wm z W x W x... x W be the mn-dimensional cross product of m sets W.
Furthermore, for y-(yl ,....,ym) E Wm, let hl(y) e Rn be defined by
htj(Y) a etj(gt(Y), Gt(Y)) - tv'j. j ~ I,....n, i- 1,....m.
Clearly, ht(y) E W. Since gt and Gt are continuous functions, the strict quasi-
concavity of the utility functions implies that h~(hl,...,hm) is a continuous function
from Wm into itself. According to Brouwer's fixed point theorem there exists a y in
Wm such that ht e et et(y ) a y , i- I,...,m. Clearly, the effective demand vectors y E
~
Rn, i~ I,...,m, constitute a K-equilibrium with transactions Ft(y ) and rationing
schemes ( Bt(Ye). GI(Ye)). i s 1,...,m.
Thie doa not exclude that then u~ chain or tredm (il,...,ik) end a chain or conurwditip (jt,...jk), eucó
that tor sll h- 1,...,k, trsder ih ia conetrsined in the demind of sood jh and not conetruned in tha eupply ot
~ood jhtt, rith htl - 1 if h- k. In euch e eue a Pveto improremant u pouible by reakenin~ for ell h the
comtnint or comumer ih on the dem~nd tor ~ood jh.
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A K-equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4.1 for two consumers, A and B, and
two non-money commodities. In this figure the origin denotes the no trade situation.
On the horizontal axis we have the variables zAI to the right and zBl to the left, and
on the vertical axis the variables z``~2 downwards and zB2 upwards. Consequently,
each point z denotes a feasible trade with zA -(zl,-z2) and z6 ~(-z1,z2). [f the
transaction is carried out consumer i's utility equals u~(xt) with xtj 3 w~j t ztj, j-1,2,
and x~B L w'0 - Ej pjz~j, i ~ A,B. So, for both i, the indifference curves I~ of i are
curves around the point m~ reflecting the unconstrained optimal excess demand. At
the optimal points mA and mB the excess demand of consumer A for commodity 1
exceeds the excess supply of consumer B for that commodity, while for commodity 2
the excess demand of consumer B exceeds the excess supply of consumer A. This
Icads to demand rationing on bo[h markets. Let LA 1 ~ mA 1 be the demand rationing
for A on the first market. Then, the effective excess demand for commodity I equals
mAl, because A does not take into account this rationing in determining his
effective demand for commodity 1. However, the effective excess demand for
commudity 2 becomes equal to the second ( negative) component of the point which
maximizes uA(xA) under zAl c LA1, i.e., the effective excess demand for
commodity 2 becomes equal to the second component of the point where an
indifference curve of A is tangent to the line zAI s LAt. Let mA(LAI) be this
point, then (m`41,mA2(LAI)) is [he effective excess demand of consumer A given
the rationing LAI on the demand of commodity I. Similarly, with m6(L62) the
tangent point on the indifference curve of B tangent to the tine zB2 - LBZ,
(m61(LB,),mB2) is the effective excess demand of consumer B given the rationing
LB2 ~ mB2 on the demand of commodity 2. Given these effective demands, the
assignments become (-mBl(L62),mA2(LAI)) for consumer A and ( mBt(L62),-
mA2(LAI)) for consumer B. An equilibrium is obtained if LA1 --mBl(L62) and
LB2 --mA`(LAI), i.e., at the point K where the offer curves zA ~ mA(LAI), LAI
? 0, and zB ~ m6(L62), L62 ~ 0, intersect each other.
Insert Figure 4.1.
It should be observed that both agents prefer the point H above K. This
shows that generally a K-equilibrium is not Pareto optimal nor even optimal with
respect to the price system p. That means, given p, there exists feasible transactions
y~, satisfying the budget constraint xt~ - wt0 - Ej pjz~j ~ 0, i a l,...,m, which are
preferred by all agents above z~.
The figure also suggests an iterative method to find a K-equilibrium. Let
(LA1, LB,) with 0 5 LA1 5 mAI and 0 5 L62 c mB2 be a rationing scheme on the
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excess demands for A and B on the commodities I and 2 respectively. Then the new
rationing scheme becomes (KA1, KBZ) with KA1, the demand rationing for consumer
A, equal to the assignment -mBl(LBZ) of commodity 1 to consumer B and with KBZ
equal to -mAZ(IAI). Continuing this procedure leads to the K-equilibrium rationing
scheme. liowever, generally, the iteralive procedure (!.',K') -(g'(ë), C:'(ë)) 1'ur
alI i, with ë~(ël,...,ëm) the effective excess demands obtained for the
previous rationing schemes (!', Lt), i~ 1,...,m, need not to converge to a set of K-
equilibrium rationing schemes.
~, Tvoolosv of K-eouilibria
In a K-equilibrium we have for each market that there is either rationing on
the demands, or rationing on the supplies, or no rationing at all. So, for each market
there are three possibilities. This implies that for an economy with n non-money
commodities the number of different regimes equals 3n with 2n of them having
rationing on all markets. When all prices of the non-money commodities are very
high, we have in general excess supply on all markets. On the other hand, there will
be excess demand on all markets if all prices are very low. Intermediate cases occur
when some oC the prices are relatively high, and the others are relatively low. For the
case with n a 2 the different regimes in the price space are sketched in Figure 5.1.
In region I with pl and p2 rather high, there is supply rationing on both markets,
while in region ITI both markets are in excess demand. In region II (IV), commodity
2 is in excess demand (supply) and commodity 1 in excess supply (demand). On the
boundary between two regions we have rationing on only one market. The prices
pW 1 and pWZ at the intersection point E of all regions are the Walrasian prices. For a
numerical example we refer to Benassy (1975).
Insert Figure 5.1.
We will consider now the different regions in more detail. First we consider
region I, in which there is supply rationing on both markets. If all agents are
suppliers of both commodities, then no trade is feasible and a no trade equilibrium is
achieved by setting 1'1 ~!t2 - 0 for all i. A more interesting case occurs when some
of the agents are suppliers of commodity 1 and démanders of commodity 2, say type
A agents, and some other agents, say [ype B agents are demanders of commodity 1
and suppliers of commodity 2. Of course, for both commodities the total supply
exceeds the total demand. Now, an equilibrium is achieved by setting rations !tl (~ 0)
on the supplies of good 1 Cor the agents i of type A and rations !t2 (5 0) on the
supplies of good 2 for the agents i of type H, such that the total effective demand of
15
the agents of type A(respectively B) for good 2(respeclively I) equals the total
rationed supply
EiEB I!'z~ of commodity 2(respectively the total rationed supply
EiEA Il~tl of commodity I). Of course, the effective demand of agent i of type A
(respectively B) for good 2(respectively 1) depends on his ration !tt (respectively
!~2). Now, suppose agents of a third type, say type C, enter the scene with a demand
for one of the commodities, say I. The result is that agents of type A are able to sell
more of commodity 1, so that their rations are weakened, i.e., the amounts ~lrl~
become greater. This increases the budget of the agents of type A for commodity 2,
and hence the demands for commodity 2 will increase. Now, the agents of type B are
able to sell more of commodity 2, and this will result in an additional demand for
commodity 1 of the agents of type B. In this way we get the multiplier effect. The
initial rationings on the supplies of commodity 1 have not only to be weakened to
covering the demand of the agents of type C for commodity 1, but also to absorb the
induced additional demand of the agents of type B for this commodity. Moreover,
the initial rationiogs on the supplies of commodity 2 for the agents of type B have to
be weakened to cover the induced additional demand for commodity 2 of the agents
oC type A. [n cases of general ezcess supplies the government can therefore reduce
the excess supplies (unemployment) by triggering off the multiplier effect through
increasing their own demand for the commodities (i.e., eztra government spendings).
In the same way the govcrnment can reduce the excess demands by decreasing their
demands if the economy is in a region III situation (general demand rationing).
We now consider the case that the economy is in a region lí (or analogousty
region IV) situation. In region II there is suppty rationing on commodity 1 and
demand rationing on commodity 2. So, the agents of type A are rationed in their
supplies of commodity 1 and in their demands Cor commodity 2, whereas the agents
of type B are not rationed at all. In this case an additional demand of agents of type
C for commodity 1 does not induce a multiplier effect. The onty result is that the
agents oC type A are able to sell more of commodity 1. This results in an additonal
demand of these agents for commodity 2. However, the agents of type B are not
constrained at all and therefore their supplies of commodity 2 do not change. So, the
rationings on the demands of the agents of type A for commodity 2 have to stay on
the same level. Therefore, the additional sale oC commodity 1 by the agents of type
A results in higher terminal hotdings of money by these agents.
A specific example oC a two non-money commodity economy is the
Barro~Grossman-Malinvaud model. This model has been described in full detail in
Malinvaud (1977). In this model the two commodities are consumption good
(commodity 1) and labour (commodity 2). There is one producer, which is an agent
of type A, supplying the consumption good and demanding for labour. The agents of
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type B are the consumers, who supply labour and have a demand for the
consumption good. Moreover the consumers have initial holdings of money. Money
has utility as a means to transfer utility from the current period to the next period.
The government with a demand for the consumption good is an agent of type C. In
region I with roughly speaking a high (commodity) price p and a high (labour) wage
w, the producer is constrained in his supply of the consumption good and the
consumers are constrained in their supplies of labour (i.e., unemployed). This region
ís called the region of Keynesian Unemployment. The unemployment can be reduced
by increasing the demand of the government for the consumption good. In region III,
with a relatively low price and a low wage, the producer is constrained in his
demand for labour and the consumers in their demand for the consumption good. [n
this region of Repressed Inflation the constraints can be weakened by decreasing the
government demand of the consumption good. In region IV, with a low price for the
consumption good and a high labour wage, the producer is unconstrained, whereas
the consumers are constrained in the demand for the consumption good and in the
supply of labour. In this case a change of the government demand dces not affect the
unconstrained producer and only has an impact on the rationing of the consumers.
This region is called the region of Classical Unemployment. Because the producer can
not be rationed simultaneously on his demand for labour and his supply of the
consumption good we do not have region II in this model. On the boundary between
the regions I and II the producer is constrained in either the demand for labour or
the supply of the consumption good. ln more complicated models, for instance a
multi-period model in which the producer can keep consumption goods in stock, a
non-empty region II is possible and is called the region of Under-Consumption. The
typical partition oC the price~wage space for the standard Malinvaud model without
the possibility of underconsumption is sketched in Figure 5.2, in which p and w
are the equilibrium prices.
Insert Figure 5.2.
b. Rationine schemes
Until now we did not specify the rationing schemes. lt should be clear,
however, that the equilibrium allocation depends on the specific rationing scheme.
Drèu (1975), for instance, uses a uniform rationing scheme where the constraints on
market j do not depend on the identity of the agent, i.e., lt - 1 and L' - L for aIl i.
Other rationing schemes may serve as well. For supply rationing, Kurz (1982)
introduced the notion of fractional rationing, i.e., for all i and j, Itj ~-aw~j, with 0
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5 0 5 I. In this framework a is the Craction of the initial endowment which can not
be offered Cor sale. In a stochastic framework n can be interpreted as the probability
of becoming unemployed. For studies on stochastic rationing schemes we refer to e.g.
Svensson (1980) and Wu (1985). Other examples of rationing are queueing and
priority systems (see Benassy (1982, page 18)). Drazen ( 1980) argues that it is of
secondary importance which specific agents face rationing as long as we are
concerned with the aggregate constraint. It should be noticed, however, that the
allocation oC the shortages is crucial in determining whether an equilibrium is socially
acceptable or not.
Another ezample of rationing is proportional rationing ( see Benassy (1982,
page 19)). However, here the problem of manipulable rationing arises. A rationing
scheme is non-manipulable if the assignments to agent i only depend on the
expressed excess demands of the other agents. Under proportional rationing agents on
the short side realize their demands, but agents on the long side receive an
assignment proportional to their demand or supply. So, the assignment to agent i
depends not only on the ezpressed excess demands of the other agents, but also on
the excess demand expressed by himself. For example, for some market j, let d' be
the excess demand of agent i. Then D- Ei max (0, dl) is the total positive excess
demand and S~ Ei max ( 0, -d') the total positive excess supply. Under proportional
rationing consumer i receives in case D ~ S
z~-d'ifd'c0andz'sd'S~Difd'~0
and when D c S
z~ ~ d' if d' i 0 and z' 3 d'D~S if d' ~ 0.
It is obvious that under proportional rationing an agent has the possibility to
break the constraint by overbidding. If all agents behave in this way, no equilibrium
may exist. Clearly, the proportional rationing is not consistent with Drbze's concept
of constrained equilibrium. In the latter the agents maximize their utility under the
ex-ante given rationing scheme, while under proportional rationing the scheme is
determined ex-post depending on the actual demands and supplies. Proportional
rationing, however, easily fits in Benassy's framework of a K-equilibrium, because in
a K-equilibrium the transactions depend on the effective demands through the
assignment functions F~. Therefore, let us reconsider the K-equilibrium. In
equilibrium, the actual transactions z'j ~ F'j(é), j~ 1,...,n, of agent i occur given
the effective excess demands éh, h Q I,...,m. Moreover, the rationing schemes
(I~,L') satisfy f'j a z'j if z'j i ë'j and L'j ~ z'j if z'j c étj. Ex post, the realized
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transactions maximize utility over the feasible transactions I'j 5 z'j ~ L~j, j~ 1,...,n.
This characterization of a K-equilibrium shows that the binding constraints are
determined through the assignment functions F'j. We have seen that given the
rationing scheme ( !',L') for all agents i the eCfective demand e'(1',L') is an element
of E'(1~,L'), i.e., the consumption realized through the expected transactions z'j(l~,L')
z maz(f~j, min(é'j, G'j)), j z I,...,n, maximizes i's utility. However, if the agent is
aware of the fact that the rationing is determined through the assignments, he would
not ezpress an element of E~(l~,L') as his excess demand, but an excess demand ê'
such that the consumption induced by the assignments z'j - F'j(ê), j~ I,...,n,
yields maximization of his utility, where êh, h t i, are agent i's expectations
about the expressed demands of the other agents. In other words, agent i expresses
effective demands ê'j, j a I,...,n, such that the consumption induced by
i'j - max(g'j(ê), min(ê'j, G'j(ê))),
j~ I,...,n, maximizes his utility. So, the agent will not maximize his utility under the
given rationing scheme (1',L'), but under the expected new rationing scheme
(g'(ê), G~(ê)). If the rationing functions g~ and G' are manipulable, i.e., they
depend on the effective demand ê' ezpressed by agent i, and if atl agents behave
in this way, then the effective demands can not longer be restricted to belong to a
bounded set and the fixed point argument can no be applied to prove Theorem 4.4.
So, the rationing functions g' and Gt should only depend on the expressed demands
of the other agents.
7. Existence of constrained eouilibria
In Section 4 the ezistence of a Drèze equilibrium, i.e., a constrained
equilibrium without quantity constraints on the numeraire commodity, has been
proved through proving the existence of a K-equitibrium. This proof uses a fixed
point argument in the mn-dimensional space Wm. We noticed already that the
iterative adjustment of the quantity constraints does not need to converge to an
equilibrium. If not, we have to solve a system of equations to compute an
equilibrium. In this case it is of great help to lower the dimension of the problem.
Therefore we give a direct proof of the ezistence of a constrained equitibrium. The
direct proof given in this section is based on the ezistence of fixed points in some
appropiate (ntl)-dimensional set. Moreover, this type of proof allows for more
general sets of admissible prices, white also the existence of other types of
constrained equilibria can be proved, in particular the existence of a supply-
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constrained equilibrium. Finally, we do not need to specify the constraint functions
g~ and Gr.
Instead of commodity 0 we allow in this section for an arbitrarily chosen
commodity as the numeraire commodity and hence we assume that the set of
admissible prices is given by
P-(P E() I 0 c pj ~ pj ~ pj c oo for all j).
For an a-priori chosen numeraira commodity h we say that a constrained equilibrium
is a Drèu equilibrium with respect to h if commodity h is not rationed. Yan der
Laan (1980) considered a model without an a-priori chosen numeraire commodity. In
this case the existence of a supply-constrained or unemployment equilibrium can be
proved. If at an unemployment equilibrium commodity h is not rationed, then ez
post commodity h can be chosen as the numeraire commodity and the equilibrium is
ex post a supply-constrained Drèu equilibrium with respect to commodity h.
To prove the ezistence of a Drèu or an unemployment equilibrium we
construct an excess demand function z for which each uro point yields a constrained
equilibrium. Then we show that there do exist uro points of z for which the
corresponding equilibria are Drèze or unemployment equilibria. For simplicity we
assume uniform rationing schemes (I,L) in the remaining of this paper. Let Q be the
(nt I)-dimensional subset of fl given by
Q-(q E f2 ~ 0 5 q 5 2p}.
For q E Q, let p(q) E P, 1(q) E-f2, and L(q) E() be defined by
Pj(q) - max ( pj, min(D~.qj)), j- 0,...,n,
!j(q) s -min (1. qj~lZj}wj, j - 0....,n,





The functions pj(q), !j(q), Lj(q) are illustrated in Figure 7.1. Observe that Qj
5 qj 5 Pj implies Dj(q) - qj. !j(q) --wj, and Lj(q) - wj. When qj ~ pj, then
Pj(q) - Pj. !j(q) --wj, and Gj(q) -(2 - qj~Dj)wj ~ wj. When qj ~ pj then Djíq)
- nj. t~(q) --qjwjllzj ? -wj, and Lj(q) - wj.
Insert Figure 7.1.
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Let x~(q), i- 1,...,m, be the utility maximizing consumption of consumer i in the
budget set
B~(q) ~(xEX~ ~ PT(q)x 5 PT(q)w~, !(q) ~ x-wt ~ L(q))
and let z(q) L 2:i(x~(q)-w~). From the assumptions Al, A2 and A3 it follows that x~ is
a continuous function of q and satisfies pT(q)x~(q) ~ pT(q)w~, i~l,...,m. Hence, z is a
continuous function from Q into Rntl satisfying pT(q)z(q) ~ 0 for all q E Q. Observe
that qj ~ 0 implies lj(q) z 0 and hence zj(q) ~ 0, while qj ~ 2pj implies Lj(q) - 0
and hence zj(q) ~ 0.
Lemma 7.1. A zero point q~ of z induces a constrained equilibrium x'(q~), i-I,...,m,
p(q), !(q ), and L(q~).
Proof: By construction we have p(q~) E P, I(q ) e-fl, L(q~) e(t, and for all i x~(q~)
a d~(p(q ) , !(q~), L(q~)). Further, since z(q ) ~ 0, we obtain Ei x~(q )~ w. With z~(q)
the excess demand x'(q) - w' at q of agent i, we have that at a uro point q of z the
excess demand of agent i of commodity j satisfies
s
-wj~-w~j5z~j(q )Swj-w'j~wj.
By construction, !j(q) i-wj implies pj(q) ~ pj and Lj(q) - wj, while L~(q) ~ wj
im lies ~p pj(q) - p. and Ij(q) --wj. Hence at a uro point q of z, xt(q ), i-
1,...,m, p(q ), 1(q~, and L(q ) satisfy all the conditions of Definition 3.1.
~ ~
If z(q )- 0 and ph 5 q h 5 ph, then at the constrained equilibrium induced
by q commodity h ís not rationed. In fact qh ~ ph implies that the demand of
commodity h is not rationed, while qh ~ Qh implies that the supply is not rationed.
Hence we have the following corollaries.
Corollarv 7.2. When for some h, h E(0,...,n), Qh ~ q.h ~ ph~ then a uro point q~
of z yields a Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity h.
~
Corollarv 7.3. A constrained equilibrium induced by a uro point q of z yields an
unemployment equilibrium if there exists an h with ph 5 qh 5 ph and qj 5 pj
for all j ~ h.
zi
The next lemma says that any one oC the counting variables qj can be chosen
freely, in the sense that if one of these variables is given an a-priori value, there
exists a zero point of z for which that variable has this value. In fact, if for some j,
qj is fixed, then it is possible to determine the other variables qh, h f j, such that
all markets h~ j are in equilibrium. Since for all q we have pT(q)z(q) ~ 0(Walras'
law), market j must be in equilibrium if all markets h~ j are in equilibrium.
Lemma 7.4. For each qh, 0 c qh ~ 2ph, h E(0,...,n), there exists a zero point
q ot' z such that q~h ' qh-
Proof: Let the continuous function f from Q to Q be defined by
fj(q) - max ( 0, min (2Pj, qj t zjíq))). 1~ h,
and fh(y) z qh. According to Brouwer's fixed point theorem there exists a point
q~ in Q such that f(q~) a q. Clearly, q~h m qh. Suppose that for some j~ h, q
~ ~ j~ 2pj (respectively a 0), then zj(q ) ~ 0(respectively i 0), and hence f.(q )~ q
~ , j
implies zj(q ) a 0. When for some j~ h, 0 ~ q~j ~ 2pj, then fj(q ) a q j t zj(q )
and hence zj(q ) z 0. Consequently, the fixed point q of f implies that zj(q ) ~ 0
for all j~ h. Together with Walras' law and the fact that p,h ~ 0 this implies that~ ~
also zh(q ) L 0 and hence q is a zero point of z.
Theorem 7.5. For each h, there exists a Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity
h.
Pr4QL; Set qh such that Qh ~ qh c ph, The theorem follows from Corollary
7.2 and Lemma 7.4.
The existence of an unemployment equilibrium follows immediately from the
next lemma, which says that for each a-priori chosen 6, 0 S 6 5 1, there exists a zero~
point q of z on the upper boundary of the boz
Qó 3{q E Q ~ maxh yh~2ph ~ b}.
Thus, mazh qh~2ph is now taken fixed instead of giving one of the variables an a
priori chosen value.
Lemma 7.tí. For each b, 0 ~ b 5 I, there exists a zero int ~po q in Q of z such that
maxj qj~2pj ~ á.
zz
Proof: For d- I, q' - 2p yíelds the trivial equilibrium x'(q)- w' for all i, !(q~)
--w, L(q') a 0, and p(q) - p, and hence z(q)- 0. So, suppose that 0 ~ 6 ~ 1.
For all q E Qá, let r(q) be the intersection of the set (q E Q ~ mazj qj~2pj - á) and
the line segment from q to 2p. So, r(q) -(1-a(q)~ t a(q)2p, where
a(q) a (á2Ph - 4h)I(2Ph - qh)
with h an index such that qh~2ph - maxj qj~2pj, see Figure 7.2.
Insert Figure 7.2.
By construction r(q) - q if qh~2ph - ó and rj(q) ~ qj Cor all j if qh~2ph ~ d.
Let the continuous function f from Qá to Qá be defined by
fj(q) - max (0, min (á2Pj. rj(q) t zj(q))). 1- 0,...,n.
Again according to Brouwer's fixed point theorem there exists a point q in Qá such
that f ~ ' ' ' '(q )á q. Suppose that maxj q J~2pj c 6, and hence rj(q: i q j for all j.
Because q j- fj(q ) this implies zj(q ) ~ 0 for all j. Since pj(q ) L Qj ~ 0 for all j
this contradicts Walras' law. Hence the fixed point q of f satisfies maxj qj~2pj -
~ ~
6. It remains to prove that zj(q )- 0 for all j. Since mazj q j~2pj - á implies
~ ~
r(q ) - q , we obtain
~ ~ s
q j- max ( 0, min (á2pj, q j t zj(q ))), j - 0,...,n.
If for some j we have q~ - 0, then z.(q ) ~ 0 and hence f.(q)- q implies z.(q~) -~ J ~ ~ J ~ J 1~ J
0. If 0 ~: j ~ s2pj, then fj(q.) - q j implies zj(q )- 0. Finally, iC q j- 62pj,
then f- 'J(q )- q j implies zj(q )~ 0. Again from Walras' Iaw snd the fact that pj(q )
~ ~ ~
~ 0 this implies that also zj(q )- 0 if q j - b2pj, and hence q is a zero point of
z.
Theorem 7.7. There exists an unemployment equilibrium, such that there is an
unrationed commodity h with price equal to ph.
~prooC: Take 6 z 1~2. From Lemma 7.6 it follows that there exists a zero point q of z
s:ch that maxj qj~2pj - l~2: So, at q~ there exists an index h such that~q h~2ph - 1~2, implying that q h- ph and hence ph(q )- ph. Moreover,
we have q~j 5 pj for aIl j ~ h, implying that there is no rationing on the demands.
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It should be observed that the rationing is completely determined by q
through (7.3) and (7.4). By taking continuous individual constraint Cunctions !~j(q)
and L~j(q) satisfying l~j(q) a 0 if qj - 0, l~j(q) ~- w~j if qj i pj, L~j(q) a 0 if qj ~
2pj, and L~j(q) ~ wj if qj ~ pj, the existence of constrained equilibria can be
proved under non-uniform rationing.
As mentioned alread in the ~y proof of Lemma 7.6, we have that for ë- 1, q
~ 2p yields the trivial equilibrium with L. 0, i.e., with complete rationing of all
the demands. Also, for á- 0, q~ - 0 is the unique element in Q~ and yields the
trivial equilibrium with complete rationing of all the supplies.
We have seen that due to Walras' law there is one degree of freedom in the
set Q of variables determining the prices and the rationing schemes. When defining
the function h from Q to Rn}l by: j(q) - pj(q)zj(q), j~ 0,...,n, we have that h and z
are equivalent in the sense that z ~(q ) s 0 iC and only if h(q ) 3 0. Clearly, because of
Walras' law, Ej hj(q) -0 and hence h is a continuous function from the (ntl)-
dimensional set Q to the n-dimensional set
S'(Y E Rnal I Ej Yj a ~)
In general we have because of the implicit function theorem that for a continuously
differentiable function h: Q-. S and a regutar value c E S of h, the set h-l(c) is a
disjoint union of paths and loops. Each path or loop is a one-dimensional manifold.
A loop is a closed cycle and has no end points, while a path has two end points on
the boundary of Q. We have seen that the function h: Q-. S has two zero points on
the boundary of Q, namely q~ s 0 and q~ 2p, corresponding to the two trivial
equilibria. Now, assume that zj(q) ~ 0 if both qj - 0 and there exists an h with qh ~
0. This assumption says that Ihere is a positive excess demand for commodity j if it
cannot be offered for sale (qj a 0 implies Ij(q) - 0) and at least one other commodity
can be offered for sale. So, at least one consumer wants to buy some amount of
commodity j. Also, assume that zj(q) c 0 if both qj - 2pj and there exists an h
with qh c 2ph. Under these assumptions q~ - 0 and q- 2p are the only two
zero points of h on the boundary of Q. So, if 0 E S is a regular value of h and h is
continuously differentiable, then h-l(0) contains just one path. This path runs from 0
to 2p. The existence of such a path proves immediately both Lemma 7.4 and
Lemma 7.6. Indeed, a path from q~ 0 to q- 2p crosses at least once the set {q E
Q ~ qh - qh} for any 0 ~ qh ~ 2ph, h E{0,...,n}, as well as the upper boundary
of Qá for any 0 5 ë 5 1. However, the reverse is not true, i.e., the Lemmas 7.4 and
7.6 do not prove the existence of a path connecting 0 and 2p. On the contrary,
there are severe diCficulties in províng the existence of such a path. From Sard's
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theorem it follows that if h is continuously differentiable almost every c E S is a
regular value of h and hence we could assume that the vector of zeros is a regular
value of h. However, h is in general not continuously differentiable. This follows
immediately from the fact that pj(q) is not differentiable at points q where qj equals
pj or pj. Moreover, zj(q) is not differentiable at a point q at which a consumer
switches from not being rationed to becoming rationed in commodity j. IYevertheless,
using simplicial approximation theory (e.g. see van der Laan (I982) and van der Laan
and Talman (1987)) we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7.8. For any c ~ 0, there exists a path of points HE in Q with end points q
- 0 and q- 2p,such that
maxj Ih j(q)I e e
for any q E Hf.
So, for any c i 0, there ezists a path of approximating zero points of h with
accuracy equal to e. Since ~hj(qH c e implies ~zj(q)I c e~pj it follows that there is a
path of approximating zero points of z connecting 0 and 2p, and hence a path of
approximating constrained equilibria connecting the two trivial equilibria. In the
sequel, if we speak about the path H of (constrained) equilibria we mean the path of
approximating equilibria induced by the points on the path HE of approzimating zero
points of z for an arbitrarily small c~ 0.
8 Sunolv-constrained versus demand-constrained eauilibria
In the previous section we proved the existence of an unemployment or
supply-constrained equilibrium. Analogously the existence of a demand-constrained
equilibrium can be proved. Instead of doing so, let us consider the path H of
equilibria connecting the two trivial equilibria. Without loss of generality, we say that
there is supply rationing on commodity j if qj c pj and hence Ij ~-wj and that there
is demand rationing on commodity j if qj i pj and hence Lj c wj. Observe that
commodity rationing defined in this way does not imply rationing of the consumers
in that commodity; it only means that it may occur that a consumer is rationed in
that commodity.
Going along the path H from 0 to 2p we have that for each j the variable
qj gces from 0 to 2pj, all passing the interval [pj, pj]. If qj c pj we have that
!j i-wj and Lj z wj, and hence commodity j is rationed on the supply side.
Furthermore, pj 5 qj 5 pj implies that !j --wj and Lj . wj, and hence commodity
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j is not rationed at all. Finally, for qj i pj we have that Ij z-wj and Lj ~ wj, so
that commodity j is rationed on the demand side. So, for all q on the path close to 0,
namely for q with qj ~ Qj for all j, we have supply rationing on each market, while
for all q close to 2p, namely with qj ~ pj for all j, we have demand rationing
on each market. Going along the path from 0 to 2p each market switches therefore
first from supply rationing to no rationing and eventually to demand rationing. Going
along the path H and starting at q- 0, let h be the first index ior which qh becomes
equal to Qh, say at point q-. Then q- yields a supply-constrained equilibriuro with no
rationing of commodity h. This equilibrium is also a Drèze equilibrium with
commodity h as the ex post chosen numeraire. On the other hand, Iet qt be a point
on the path such that there is an index k with qk ~ pk and qj ~ pj for all j~k.
It follows from the discussion above that such a point exists on the path of equilibria.
Then qt yields a demand-constrained equilibrium with commodity k unrationed 4). It
is also a Drèze equilibrium with commodity k as the ex post chosen numeraire. As
argued above, for any j there exists a point q on the path such that Qj ~ qj ~ pj.
Such a point yields a Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity j as the
unrationed ex post chosen numeraire commodity. For all other commodities there is
either demand rationing or supply rationing or neither. For j e h we have an
equilibrium with supply rationing on the other commodities, for j- k we have an
equilibrium with demand rationing on the other commodities 6). Roughly speaking,
we may say that, relative to the Walrasian price system, commodity h has the lowest
price and commodity k has the highest price. To conclude this discussion, let us
consider the case that along the path H, qj increases monotonically for all j, and that
at any point q along H at most one variable qj lies in the interval [Qj, pj]. The
latter is in general true if for all j, Qj is close or equal to pj. In this case there is
an ordering i0 (-h), il,...,in-1, in (~k) of the indices 0,...,n, such that for all j at the
induced Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity ij, the commodities ij~l,...,in
are supply constrained and the commodities i0,...,ij-1 are demand constrained, so that
along the path H all markets switch successively in this order from supply to demand
rationing.
The motivation behind the proof of a supply-constrained equilibrium lies in
the idea that demand rationing rarely occurs in market economies whereas supply
rationing is very common. Clearly, pure existence does not explain why supply-
constrained equilibria should occur more frequently than demand-constrained
equilibria. We return to this topic in Section 10. Another problem in the theory of
~ A tormal proof ot tha exietence o[ a demand-eona[rainad aquilibrium ~oae doos tha linr of the exLteou
proot ot a eupply-corutrained equilibrium.
6) Flo.vever, obeerre thst nothin` hu txan aaid about unieity, w that alw othu auppty-eomtrained or
demand-conatrained aquilibria msy occur.
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supply-constrained equilibria has been raised by Dehez and Drèze (1984). They argue
that in an economy with money, it is more realistic to choose money a priori as the
unrationed numeraire commodity, since quantity constraints on net trades of money
are very rarely observed. By definition, a supply-constrained equilibrium excludes
the possibility of an a priori chosen numeraire commodity. In other words, rationing
of money may happen in a supply-constrained equilibrium. Dehez and Drèze
however provided sufficient conditions for the existence of a supply-constrained
equilibrium with no rationing on ao a priori chosen always desired numeraire
(money). In fact, it is sufficient and necessary to allow for flexible money prices.
9. Flexible money t)rices
In this section we consider a simplified version of the Dehez-Drèze model e)
(see also van der Laan (1984)). This simplification dces not affect the generality of
the results. In the model, the relative prices of the non-money commodities are
bounded by upper and lower bounds. In the eztreme case that the upper bounds are
equal to the lower bounds, we have that for each pair of non-money commodities the
ratio of the prices is fixed, but the level of these prices with respect to the price of
money is not fized. The price level of the non-money commodities is determined by
a price indez, which is determined by the prices of the index commodities. This set
of index makers is a subset of the set of commodities other than money. Under
certain restrictions on the prices of the indez commodities, there exists a supply-
constrained equilibrium such that money is not rationed.
The money commodity, indexed by j~ 0, is again used as the numeraire
commodity and its price is set equal to 1. The set I of index commodities is a subset
oC {1,...,n) and defines a price index ~r(p) a ir(pj, jEI). This index determines the
level of the prices of all the non-money commodities j, j- I,...,n. The price index
function x is assumed to be continuous in p and homogeneous of degree one, i.e.,
x(ap) - mr(p) for aIl a ~ 0. The relative prices of the non-money commodities,
i.e., the ratios between the prices of the commodities and the price indez, are
restricted. So, the set P of admissible prices is given by
P~(D E n I P~ - I, x(P)2j 5 Pj 5 x(P)Pj.~1al,...,n),
with 0~ x(pj, jEI) ~ 1 5 tr(pj, jEI) and 0 ~ pj ~ pj ~ oo for all j. The latter
s
restrictions ensure that P is not empty.
In th~ modd of Dehaa md Drèsa than u also ~ produetion rctor.
As an example, let n a 2 with commodity j- I labour and commodity j- 2 a
consumption good. In case of price indexation for the wages the level of the wages
will depend on the price of the consumption good. We have then that 1-(2), and for
instance the rice index ~p x(p) - p2. Hence the price set P is equal to
~
P~(P E Rt3 ~ Pp - 1, P2QI ~ PI 5 PZPI ).
i.e., the ratio between the price of labour and the price of the consumption good is
bounded, and fixed if pl ~ pl. Observe that the restriction p2p2 5 p2 5 p2p2 is
redundant, because the non-emptiness of P requires that p2 5 1 and p2 i 1.
Normalizing the prices by setting ir(p) - I instead of p0 - 1 we obtain the set
of prices
p' ~{p E tl ~ p~ ~ 0. 2j 5 Pj 5 Dj. jal....,n, and xíD) - 1}.
~
Clearly, because of the homogeneity of r we have that if ~r(p) i 0 then p E P
implies that p~ r-I(p)p E P'. Also, if p~ i 0 then p E P' implies p- p0-Ip E
~
P, since a(p0- I p) - Pp- I by the Cact that x is homogeneous and ~r(p) - 1 for p E
P'.
We have seen in the previous sections that in a constrained equilibrium supply
rationing is only allowed if the price is on its lower bound. However, without further
assumptions this complementarity condition between rationing and price binding can
not be guaranteed to hold when dealing with the set P'. Since x(p) is restricted to be
equal to one, the prices of the index makers can not reach the lower bounds
simultaneously if ~r(pj, jEI) ~ 1. So, excess supply can not enforce minimum prices
for all index makers simultaneously, unless ~r(pj, jEI) - 1. Therefore in the following
we consider the case that the lower bounds pj satisfy ~t(Qj, jEI) - 1. Assuming that
x(p) i x(p) if p i p and pj ~ pj for at least one j E I, p ~ Q and x(p) -
1 Cor all p implies that pj - Qj for alI j E I, and hence that the indez makers have
fixed prices pj - pj s Dj.
Under the assumptions of Section 2, we are now able to state the following
resutt, which strengthens the result of Dehez and Drèze in the sense that they proved
Theorem 9.1 with in iii) !j ~ 0 instead of (j --wj. Recall that in an unemployment
equilibrium there is no demand rationing, i.e., Lj - rb for all j.
Theorem 9.1. 1f Qj - pj for all j E I, then there is an unemployment equilibrium
with allocation x~, i- I,...,m, a rationing scheme ! ~ 0, and a price p E P', such that
i) ~p - - w~.
ii) for all J, Dj ~ pj implies I1 --wj.
2~
iii) for at least one j?k 0, pj - pj and Ij --wj.
For the prooC of this theorem we refer to van der Laan (1984).
The theorem says that in case of fixed prices of the index makers there exists
a supply-constrained equilibrium with no rationing on the money commodity and no
rationing on at least one other commodity. In fact, there is an equilibrium in which
the price of an unrationed non-money commodity is on its upper bound.
The opposite case of fixed prices for the index commodities is the case that
the prices of the index commodities are free, i.e., pj - 0 and pj - oo for all j E l.
tlowever, to prove existence in this case, we need some restrictions on the price
index function ~r(p) (see Weddepohl (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion). Here we
restrict ourselves to the case that x(p) - EjEi pj. The set of admissible prices then
becomes
P" ~{p E Ct ~ Pp i 0, EjEI Dj - 1, pj 5 Pj 5 Pj, J~ Iu(O)}.
with pj s 0 for all j ff Iu[0). For technical reasons we assumed until now that pj a 0
for all j. This assumption guarantees that -pTl is positive for all I 5 0 with lj ~ 0 for
at least one non-money commodity j. By assumption A3 of Section 2 this implies that
for all i, Ej pj min(w~j, -Ij) i 0, i.e., each consumer has a positive income, which is
a necessary condition for the continuity of the excess demand functions. However, to
guarantee the continuity of the ezcess demand functions in the present case it is
sufficient that -pTl ~ 0 for all l 5 0 with 1 j ~ 0 for some j~ lu[0) or 1 j ~ 0 for all j
E I, which will be true if pj i 0 for all j~ Iu(0) and EjEj pj - ar(p) - 1 for all p.
We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 9.2. There is an unemployment equilibrium with allocation x~, i- I,...,m, a
rationing scheme 1 E-n, and a price p E P", such that
i) 10 - - w~,
ii) for all j~ lu{O), pj i pj implies Ij --wj,
iii) there is an index j~ Iu[0) with pj - pj and !j --wj, or for all j E I,
!j - - wj.
For the proof we refer again to van der Laan ( 1984).
The theorem says that in the case of free prices for the index makers there
exists a supply-constrained equilibrium such that money is not rationed and moreover
at least one of the non-indez commodities is not rationed or all index makers are not
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rationed. From the viewpoint of rationing, the index makers can be seen as a
composite commodity with price ar(p) - l. As long as all the non-index commodities
and some of the index makers are rationed, adjusting of the prices and amounts of
rationing is possible until all index makers are not rationed anymore or at least one
of the non-index makers is unrationed and has its price on the upper bound.
Kurz (1982) considered a set of admissíble prices Pm defined as
Pm -{p E Cl ~ p0 i EjE1 pj ` 1, pj z mj(ph,hEl), j!F IV(0)).
tf for j~[LJ{0}, pj ~ pj - pj, and when ~j(ph,hEi) - pjEhEl ph~ the sets
P" and Pm are equivalent since p~(pOtEhEI ph) is in Pm if p E P" and p~(EhEI ph)
is in P" if p E Pm. Kurz proved the ezistence of an unemployment equilibrium with
possibly rationing on the supply of money. The formulation of P" instead of Pm
however, enables us to exclude rationing of money supplies. So, Theorem 9.2
strengthens Kurz's result by stating that money is not rationed. On the other hand, it
extends the result of Dehez and Drèze to economies with free relative prices of the
index makers.
Further results on supply-constrained equilibria can be found in Wu (1985)
and Weddepohl (forthcoming).
10. A rationale for sunolv-constrained eauilibria
In Section 8 we showed that in a non-money economy each commodity can
be chosen as the numeraire commodity for a Drèze equilibrium. If along the path H
of equilibria in the set Q for all j the variable qj increases monotonically, there is an
ordering iO~~I~~~~~~'n-I~'n of the indices 0,...,n, such that for all j at the Drèze
equilibrium with respect to commodity with index ij as the numeraire commodity,
the commodities ij~l,...,in are not demand constrained and the commodities i0,...,ij-I
are not supply constrained. This dces not explain why supply-constrained equilibria
should occur more frequently than demand-constrained equilibria. However, the
situation differs for a money economy with flexible money prices. To illustrate this
we restrict ourselves to the case that for all ~j, pj ~ pj ~ p j. Since p and p
satisfy x(p) ~ 1 and x(p) i 1 we have that ir(p)- I and hence the price set P'
defined in Section 9 becomes
p' a{p E ft ( p0 ~ 0, pj ~ pj, j-I,...,n}.
Normalizing p0 to be equal to zero we obtain
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P~(P E Cl ~ p0 L I and for some a~ i 0. Pj a nP j. j- I,...,n),
Theorem 9.1 says that for this set of prices there exists a supply-constrained
equilibrium with no rationing on the money commodity and no rationing on at least
one non-money commodity. On the other hand, it is easy to see that for a close to
zero all markets will be in excess demand. Thís is illustrated in Figure 10.1, in which
the set of prices P has been drawn in the partitioned space of prices (pl, p2)
according to Figure 5.1. Figure 10.1 shows that the economy is in the regime of
a) demand rationing on both markets for a c tYl;
b) demand rationing on market 1 and no rationing on market 2 for n L al;
c) demand rationing on market 1 and supply rationing on market 2 for al c
aca2:
d) no rationing on market 1 and supply rationing on market 2 for u a~2;
e) supply rationing on both markets for o i Q2.
Insert Figure 10.1.
The existence of an equilibrium according to case d) has been proved in Theorem 9.1
T). However, we see that for case b) we have the analoguous result for a demand-
constrained equilibrium. [n fact, going from very low values of n to very high values
of a all markets switch from demand constrained markets to supply constrained
markets. In case that the number of markets with supply rationing is non-decreasing
when a increases, there is an ordering il,i2....,in of the indices 1,...,n and an
increasing sequence of positive numbers ok, k- 1,2,...,n, such that at prices pj -
s
o~kp j, j- 1,...,n, market ik is unrationed, the markets il,...ik-1 are supply
constrained, and the markets ik~l,...,in are demand constrained. So, again demand
rationing is as reasonable as supply rationing. However, when the ratio between the
prices of the non-money commodities are fixed, but the price level is flezible, it is
not unlikely that the price level will move upwards as long as some markets are in
excess demand. This corresponds to the idea that downward price rigidities are
stronger than upward price rigidities. Indeed, the economy tends to a supply-
constrained equilibrium if the price level gces upwards under excess demands for
some commodities. This explanation requires to reconsider the partitioning of the
non-money commodities in price making and price following commodities. When
In e~alinvsud model with s tixed ntio between tha price or the totuumption good end the wege
ot labour, wch e eupply-com[rsined equilibrium liee either on tha bordar Mtween the regiom ot dauical snd
Keynaian unemptoyment with the consutnen conetruned in their euppty or blwur, or on the bound~ry
between the regiom ot rcprcued inn~tion utd Keynaim unamployment with the producer conetr~ined in hu
eupply or the coroumption good.
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assuming that the price level goes up as long as there is demand rationing, the
commodities in excess demand are the price makers and the commodities in excess
supply are the price following commodities.
11. Unemolovment comoensation
We have seen that in an economy with non-Walrasian prices equilibrium of
demand and supply can be reached through supply rationing. Indeed, in the real
world supply rationing frequently occurs. Unemployment is a well-known example.
However, knowing that there exists an unemployment equilibrium does not help
unemployed people very much. To be unemployed has very serious social and
economic impacts. The impact of unemployment on social life is hardly to overcome.
In fact, in many cases only getting a job helps. In this sense job sharing may be of
great help. The distribution of jobs over people is determined by the rationing
scheme. In our framework we call someone unemployed (or supply-constrained) on
market h if he wants to work more (or if he wants to sell more) than the rationing
amount ~lh~. So, we do not make a difference between the case of total unemployment
(i.e., Ih - 0) and the case of underemployment (i.e., Ih ~ 0). In both cases there is a
loss of utility due to the constraint. t~f' course, the loss of utility in the case of
unemployment will be higher than the loss of utility in the case of underemployment.
In this section we consider a model in which this loss of utility is compensated by
unemployment doles or other subsidies for unemployed peopte. This results in a
model of an economy in which an agent perceives quantity constraints on his net
sales, and receives an unemployment compensation for the loss of utility due to the
constraints on the supplies. The unemployment compensations are financed by
levying taxes. We assume that there is some institution or a government which
collects the taxes and distributes the tax revenues among unemployed consumers
through lump-sum compensations. It is not our purpose to discuss taz models, but we
are only concerned about the existence of equilibria with unemployment
compensations. We first consider a model in which the tax is only levied on net
purchases.
Let us consider an economy with ntl commodities and a set of admissible
prices
P~(P E f2 ~ Qj ~ pj ~ pj for all j),
with for all j, 0 ~ pj 5 pj ~ ao, i.e., an economy without money or an a priori
chosen numeraire commodity. To finance unemployment compensations we introduce
taxes on net purchases. So, a tax vector is a vector t E í1. Given a consumption zt,
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the taz to be paid by consumer i equals tT(xt-w')t - Ej Ij(x'-w')tj with a}j - max(0,
aj). Given a price p e P, a rationing scheme ! 5 0, an excise tax vector t ~ 0, and a
lump-sum compensation s', the budget set of consumer i becomes
i i i T T i 4 T i i iB(P,l,t,s )-(x E X ~ p z t t (x-w ) ~ p w t s, f ~ x- w).
So, the consumer i is rationed in his supplies, pays (índirect) taxes on his net
purchases, and receives a lump-sum compensation s'.
I)efinition 11.1. A compensated unemployment equilibrium is an allocation x', i~
1,...,m, a rationing scheme ! E-t1, a tax vector t E fl, a price vector p E P, and a set
of compensations s', i s I,...,m, such that
a) x' maximizes u' on Bt(p,l,t,s'), i~ I,...,m,
b) Ei (x~ - w') - 0 and Ei tT(x'-w')} a Ei s',
c) for alI j, tj i 0 implies x'j - w'j a lj for all i, and xhj - whj a!j for some
h implies tj - 0,
d) for all j, pj ~ pj implies tj ~ 0, and pj ~ Qj implies !j c x'j - w'j for all
i,
e) tor all i, u~(z') - u'(xi), where z' mazimizes u' in B'(p,-w,t,0).
Condition b) states that all markets are in equilibrium and that the total tax revenue
equals the total amount of compensations. Observe that if all markets are in
equilibrium the latter follows from the fact that utility maximization implies that the
optimal consumption is on the budget line and hence the value of the total excess
demands plus the total tax revenue is equal to the total amount of compensations.
Condition c) states that on each market not simultaneously supplies are constrained
and a positive tax is levied on the net purchases. This complementarity between taxes
and constraints implies that there is just one instrument on each market to equate
demand and supply. Condition d) guarantees that there is no tax levied if the price is
not on its upper bound and that there is no supply rationing if the price is not on its
lower bound. Observe that both conditions correspond to the conditions c) and d) of
a constrained equilibrium. Condition e) determines the unemployment compensation.
The compensation for consumer i is such that the loss of utility due to the supply
constraints is just compensated by the subsidy s', i.e., the optimal consumption in the
unconstrained budget set with zero compensation is equally preferred by agent i to
the optimal consumption in the constrained budget set with income compensation s'
e)
OMerva that prcferenca ue defined on tha eomumption eet X~, i.a, utility only depende on coneumption,
includin~ leisure. In cue utility slw depende on ~hether or not hwin~ e joE, the eYUtence ot m
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In order to prove the existence of a compensated unemployment equilibrium,
let T E(1 be a vector of sufficiently high taxes, i.e., nobody wants to buy anything
of commodity j if Tj is the tax on net purchases of commodity j and there exists a
commodity h with tax th equal to zero. The assumptions A2 and A3 of Section 2
guarantee the existence of such a vector T as long as the subsidies st are bounded. It
can be easily observed that because of the monotonicity of the utilities the best
element x̀' in H'(p,-w,t,0) has a lower utility than the best element yt in
B'(p,l,t,pTw') for any ! ~ 0. Hence, the monotonicity of the utilities guarantees that
there exists an s' S pTwt such that s' just compensates for the supply rationing 1.
So, the compensations are bounded by pTw'. For all q E Q ( see (7.1)) we set p(q)
and I(q) as defined in (7.2) and ( 7.3), and define tj(q) by
tj(q) ~ max (0. (qj-pj)IPj)Tj. j - 0,...,n.
Clearly tj(q) z 0 if qj 5 pj and 1j(q) --wj if qj i Qj: Let xt(q) be the optimal
consumption in the budget set B'(q) - B'(p(q),l(q),t(q),st(q)) with st(q) defined such
that the utility of the optimal consumption z'(q) in the budget set Bt(p(q),-w,
t(q),0) is equal to ut(xt(q)). From the monotonicity of the preferences it follows that
st(q} is unique (and bounded by pTwt). From the strict quasi-concavity of the
utility functions it follows that the excess demand function z Q y Rn}1 defined by
~
z(qj ffi Ei (x'(q) - w') is continuous. It can be proved that z has a zero point q in Q
such that there ezists a j with qj ~ pj and an h~ j with q~h i ph 9). Clearly,
such a zero point yields an equilibrium xt(q ), st(q ), i~l,...,m, p(q), 1(q~), and t(q ),
s ~ ~
with Dh(q )- ptt~ lh(q )`-wh, and tj(q ) a 0. This gives us the next theorem.
Theorem 11.2. There exists a compensated unemployment equilibrium with tj ~ 0 for
at least one j, and ph ~ ph for at least one h~ j.
Recall that in case of supply constrained equilibria there are two trivial zero
points of z in Q, namely q a 0 and q ~ 2p (see Section 7). Also here the latter
point yields a[rivial equilibrium with tj ~ Tj for sll j, since for all i, xt a wt is a
maximal element in the budget set B'(p,-w,T,O). At q- 0 however, we have tj - 0
for all j, p~ p and !~ 0. Hecause all taxes are equal to zero it follows from b) of
Definition I I.1 that s' must be equal to zero for all i. However, l z 0 implies that s'
i 0 unless x' - w' is maximal in the budget set (x E Xt I Qrx ~ Qr~,i) Hence, q- 0
unemployment compensstion .ati.fying condition e) can not be guaru~tead. That meaiu, tha negative Imp~et
of Ming unemployad on .ocisl life can not ba compan.at.d.
9) The e~ci.tence ot weh . Nro point cm ba proved Dy umplicial ~pprouimation theory u~d b lxyond the
.cope of thi. paper.
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does not yield a trivial equilibrium. Since the theorem says that there is an
equilibrium with tj - 0 for at least one j, this implies the ezistence of a nontrivial
equilibrium.
From the discussion above it follows that it is possible to compensate
unemployed people for the loss of utility caused by the supply constraints and that
the unemployment doles can be financed through tazes on the net purchases. Let us
consider an example oC an economy with two commodities and two types of agents.
Agents of type A have initial endowments of commodity 1 and (almost) no
endowments of commodity 2, while for agents of type B the opposite holds. So, at all
prices, agents of type A supply commodity 1 and demand commodity 2 and reversely
for a ents of t `g ype B. Now take pl - I, let p 2 be the unique Walrasian equilibrium
~
price for commodity 2, and suppose that p2 c p Z is a fixed price for commodity 2.
Since the price of commodity 2 is too low compared to the equilibrium price, we
have that at this price system there is an ezcess supply of commodity 1 and an excess
demand of commodity 2. So, a compensated equilibrium will be reached through
rationing on the supplies of commodity 1 and levying a tax on the purchases of
commodity 2. Consequently, agents of type B are not constrained and do not pay
taxes. On the other hand agents of type A pay a tax on the purchase of commodity 2,
while at least some of them are rationed in the supplies. In case there is only one
agent of type A, this agent pays his own unemployment compensation. This is
illustrated in the Edgeworth box of Figure Il.l. In this figure agent A faces a
rationing !AI on his supply of commodity 1 and has to pay a tax t2 on the purchases
of commodity 2. Moreover, consumer A receives a compensation sA. "fhrough this
rationing, tax, and compensation system agent's A unconstrained optimal consumption
xA(p) under the budget restriction pTxA 5 pTwA, moves to the point xB(p) and
agents A consumption becomes áA - w- xB(p). For consumer A this point yields
the same utility as the unconstrained uncompensated optimal consumption zA
under the budget restriction pTxA t t2(zA2 - W,A2) ~ prwA Clearly, we have that in
this point t2(zA2 - wA2) - sA, so that consumer A pays his own compettsation.
This outcome seems to be rather unsatisfactory. However, observe that this agent is
not totally unemployed, because he can offer for sale an amount equal to the demand
of the agent of type B. In case of non-uniform rationing with each agent either
unrationed or (totally) unemployed the employed agents of type A pay taxes to
finance the unemployment compensation of the others. [f there is uncertainty about
which agents of type A are unemployed, we can say that the tax paid by an agent of
type A is a social insurance premium against the loss of income when loosing his job,
i.e., for when being excluded from the possibility to sell commodity 2.
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Insert Figure Il.l.
The vector of sales taxes plays two roles in the model of a compensated
unemployment equilibrium. Firstly, the unemployment compensation is financed from
the tax revenue, as has been discussed above. Secondly, through the system of
differentiated taxes the tax vector serves as an instrument to equaliu demand and
supply. Supply rationing occurs on markets of commodities with relative high prices,
whereas there is a purchase tax on the commodities with relative low prices. In fact,
for the Iatter commodities the demand rationing has been replaced by taxing the net
purchases. Since we introduced the tax vector in order to finance the unemployment
compensations the second role of the tax vector is figurative. Therefore, let us
consider a model in which the unemployment compensations are financed through a
taz on the income of the agents. In that case a percentage of the income is paid as an
insurance premium against unemployment. Each agent faces a tax rate Q E[0,1) to
be paid over his tax income. For some positive vector a E f2, the tax income of agent
i, i Ll,...,m, is defined by
I~(x) s DT(w~-x-a)}, x E X~.
i.e., tax must be paid over the value of the total net sales of the commodities, except
that for each commodity j there is some positive amount aj which can be sold free of
taz. Given a price p E P, a rationing scheme 1 ~ 0, an income tax rate a E[0,1), and
a compensation s' E R f, the budget set of consumer i becomes
B~(P,l,~,st) s(x E X' I PTx t al'(x) ~ DTw' t s', I ~ x-w').
Definition 1I.3. An income tax unemployment equilibrium is an allocation xt, i-
I,...,m, a rationing scheme 1 E-tl, an income tax rate o~ E[0,1], a price vector p E
P, and a set of compensations s', i- 1,...,m, such that
a) x' maximius u' on B'(p,l,rr,s')
b) Ei (z' - w') ~ 0 and Ei s' - a~Ei I'(xr).
c) for all j, Pj i pj implies !j ~ x'j - w'j for all i,
d) for all i, ut(z') s u'(iit) where ït' maximizes u' on the budget set
B~(P,-w,o,0) and x' on B'(P,l-a,a,s').
Again, condition b) implies that total tax revenue equals total amount of
compensations. The compensation of agent i is determined by d). The unemployment
dole compensates the loss of utility due to the rationing !-a. So, if agent i wants to
sell more than -1j, but not more than -ljtaj, then he is not compensated for the
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constraint on commodity j. This reflects the fact that for aIl j, a part pjaj of the
value of the net sale is free of tax, i.e., unemployment is not insured as long as the
unemployment is less or equal to some amount. The introduction oC a(relatively
small) tax free vector is not only reasonable, since small risks are typically not
insured, but has also a technical reason. Suppose that a- 0. Then a~ s 1, in which
case all income is taxed away, implies that x' - w' is a maximal element in the
budget set for all l ~ 0 and s' a 0. Hence, iC a- 0 for all l ~ 0 we have a trivial
equilibrium. For a positive vector a we still have that I- 0 implies that xt - w' is a
maximal element of the budget set and therefore yields a trivial equilibrium, because
a s 1 implies that no agent wants to sell more than aj of commodity j and hence s' -
0. However 1 t 0 may result in a positive supply of some commodity.
We have seen that in the model with taxes on net purchases there are nal
instruments to equilibriate the nt2 equations oC condition b). Now, however, there
are nf2 instruments, namely a rationing instrument on each market and the tax rate
a. However, by Walras' law we know that all equations hold as soon as ntl are
equalized. It follows that an additional condition can be stated. The next theorem
says that there exists an equilibrium with at least one unrationed commodity.
Theorem 11.4. There exists an income tax unemployment equilibrium with !j --wj
for at least one j.
For the proof, see van der Laan (1981).
We finally consider the case that Qj - pj - pj for all j and make some
remarks under several assumptions which we will not further discuss. First, let us
assume that there is a unique equilibrium with lj --wj for some j. Let Q-
a(p) be the tax rate at this equilibrium. Then it can be proved (see van der Laan
(1981)) that for all a E[~,1 ] there is an income tax unemployment equilibrium,
with lj -!j(a) ~-wj. We have already seen that for a- 1, l- 0 yields a trivial
equilibrium. In fact, when raising a from á to I the rationing is tightened (not
necessarily monotonically) from !j --wj for at Ieast one j to !j - 0 for all j. In other
words, raising the tax rate decreases the employment possibilities. Further, assume
that there is a unique Walrasian price system p-(pD,...,p n)T. Then, if p- p is
the vector of fixed prices, the unique Walrasian equilibrium allocation is induced by
the income tax unemployment equilibrium with I--w, a- 0, and s' - 0 for all i.
Moreover, for each a E(0,1 ], there exists an income tax unemployment equilibrium
with !-!(a) i-w. From this we come to the conclusion that a positive income tax
rate at the Walrasian rice s stem ~p y p induces uneroployment. When we assume that
a~(p) is continuous in p, then for any given a ~ 0, there is an income tax
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unemployment equilibrium for all p close enough to p. So, a positive tax rate
stabilizes the system in the sense that for small (temporary) disturbances in the prices
there still exists an equilibrium with the same income [ax rate, i.e., the
unemployment induced by o absorbs disturbances of the equilibrium prices, as long
as these disturbances are not too large.
12. Monev adiu tment
In the previous section we have seen that in a compensated unemployment
equilibrium it is not possible to guarantee that there is neither rationing nor taxing
on an a priori chosen numeraire commodity. However, in a monetary economy
rationing or taxing on money does not seem to be a very satisfactory result.
Therefore we discuss a modification of the compensated unemployment equilibrium,
such that there is neither rationing nor taxing on the numeraire commodity money.
In Section 9 we have seen that rationing on money in a supply-constrained
equilibrium can be excluded by flexible money prices. In fact, rationing of money
can be excluded by choosing the price level high enough. In an economy with
rationing and taxing, however, we can deal with non-flexible money prices by
allowinq for the fact that the total amount of tax revenue and the total amount of
lump-sum unemployment compensations may differ.
With the commodity indexed by j~ 0 as the numeraire commodity the set of
admissible prices becomes
P a{p E(t ~ PO 3 l, Pj s Pj 5 Pj for all j~ 0}.
withforall j ~O,O~pjtpj~oo.
Qefinition I2.1. A monetary compensated unemployment equilibrium is an allocation
x', i- I,...,m, a rationing scheme I e-fl, a tax vector t E f!, a price vector p E P,
and a set of Iump-sum compensations s', i- I,...,m, such that
I) the conditions a), c), d), and e) of Definition I l.l hold,
2) t0 z 0, and !0 --w0,
3) Ei (x~j - w'j) - 0 for j- 1,...,n, and Ei x'0 - Ei wt0 3 Ei s' - Ei tT(xt-wt)t.
Condition 2) means that neither taxing nor rationing on money is allowed. This
condition also excludes the trivial equilibrium with tj - Tj, j a 1,...,n, with Tj large
enough. The first part of condition 3) requires that all non-money markets are in
equilibrium. The second part follows then immediately from the fact that utility
maximization implies that the total value of the total excess demands must be equal
3 t3
to the total amount of compensations minus the total tax revenue. It says that the
total difference between the terminal and initial holdings of money equals the
difference between the total amount of lump-sum subsidies and the total tax rcvenue.
Theorem I2.2. There exists a monetary compensated unemployment equilibrium.
For the proof we refer to van der Laan (1980, Theorem 4).
Clearly, a monetary compensated unemployment equilibrium does not imply
that the total tax revenue Ei tT(xt-wt)} equals the total lump-sum compensations Ei
s~. [n Section 11 the only role of the government was to collect the taxes and to
distribute the revenue. However, in a monetary economy the government must also
increase or decrease the total amount of money in order to obtain equilibrium. This
results in respcctivcly inflationary or deflatíonary impulses.
In the twu sector model of Malinvaud the governmen[ demand for the
consumption good serves as an instrument for economic policy. By choosing an
exogenous demand the government has the possibility to increase or to decrease the
demand for the consumption good. The demand of the government results in an
increase or decrease of the total amount of money equal to the value of the demand
minus the income of the government. In the Malinvaud model this income comes
from taxing away the profits of the producers. So, the real savings of the consumers
are equal to the money creation or destruction by the government, being the
difference between the spending of the government on the consumption good and the
income of the government. Dehez and Gabszewicz (1977, 1979) presented a
Malinvaud-type model in which the government appears as an active economic agettt
reducing excess demand or absorbing excess supply on the commodity market. In a
dynamic setting, this behaviour forces the economy towards a stationary state, i.e., an
equilibrium such that the total initial amount of money equals the total terminal
holdings of money and hence real savings are equal to zero. More precisely, assume
that in each period the initial holding of money of any consumer is equal to his
terminal holding of money at the end of the previous period, with the initial holdings
at the first period given, then Dehez and Gabszewicz showed that under some
assumptions the sequence of disequilibrium states for the subsequent periods
converges to a stationary equilibrium state.
In the model of a monetary unemployment equilibrium we have that the
money creation or destruction is endogeneously determined by the difference
between the unemployment compensations and the tax revenue. Let us consider the
consequences of this policy for the Malinvaud-type example of an exchange economy
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as given in Section 5(see Figure 5.1). Let p be a vector of fixed prices in region I,
i.e., the region with excess supply on both markets. In our model this yields an
equilibrium with supply rationing on both markets and hence unemployment
compensations without tax revenue. So, the amount of money increases and the
terminal holdings of money will be higher than the initial holdings. Hence, in the
next period the initial holding oC money will be higher. Assuming that for all non-
money commodities the initial endowments are constant over the periods, the
Walrasian prices will move upwards because of the homogeneity of the equilibrium
prices and the money endowments. This is illustrated in Figure 12.1, where the
Walrasian prices are assumed to move upwards from (pWl, pW2) slong the curve
WW'. If the fixed price vector p is on this curve, the sequence of Walrasian
equilibrium prices will converge to p. On the other hand, the Walrasian prices will
move downwards along WW' if p is initially in region lll, i.e., the region with excess
demand on both markets. Consequently, the model results into an equilibrium with
taxes on the demands of both commodities and hence we have positive tax revenues
without unemployment compensations. Again, the sequence of Walrasian equilibrium
prices will converge to the vector p of fixed prices if p is on the curve WW'. As soon
as the Walrasian prices become equal to p a stationary state has been reached. So, we
have that the model is similar to the model of Dehez and Gabszewicz, except that the
instrument of varying the demand of the consumption goods by the government has
been replaced by the endogeneously determined system of taxes and unemployment
compensations.
Insert Figure 12.1.
In case the vector of fixed prices does not lie on the curve WW', then the
~
Walrasian prices move along the curve WW' until a price vector p has been reached
such that the real savings induced by the price system p are equal to zero. This is
illustrated in Figure 12.2, in which the broken lines divide the price spaces into
regions 1, Il, III, and IV according to the final Walrasian price system p. Observe
that according to p~ the system of fixed prices lies in region II, while p lies in region
t according to the initial Walrasian price system pW. So, the regime of excess supplies
on both markets switches to a mixed regime of excess demand on one market and
excess supply on the other market when as a consequence of the real savings the
~
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